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The Role of External Actors in Supporting Social and Political Action 
towards Empowerment and Accountability with a Focus on Fragile, 
Conflict- and Violence-Affected Settings 
Angela Christie and Richard Burge 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores the role and experience of external actors, particularly donors, in 
supporting social and political action in fragile, conflict and violence affected settings. 
Evidence is distilled from a wide range of synthesised sources to generate relevant findings 
and questions in relation to what we know and what we don’t. Included among the source 
material is a 2016 macro-evaluation of DFID’s empowerment and accountability (E&A) 
programmes which examined over 50 DFID funded projects. 
 
Themes which emerge relate to: how external actors need to think about the context and 
work politically; who are the most appropriate social and political actors to support in E&A; 
whether a direct or indirect approach to support for E&A achieves more tangible outcomes; 
whether external actors should move beyond short-term tools and tactics focused on one-
sided engagement; and whether programmes should be designed around more strategic, 
multi-faceted interventions. The paper concludes with identifying a number of gaps in the 
evidence which are translated into a range of questions which could potentially inform the 
Action for Empowerment and Accountability (A4EA) research programme. 
 
Keywords: conflict, fragility, empowerment, accountability. 
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1  Executive summary 
This paper explores the role and experience of external actors, particularly donors, in 
supporting social and political action (SPA) in fragile, conflict and violence affected settings 
(FCVAS). The paper has been produced to inform the Action for Empowerment and 
Accountability (A4EA) research programme, which attempts to address the overall research 
question: what are the best ways for external actors to support internally-led social and 
political actions or to create enabling conditions that contribute to empowerment and 
accountability? As such, the analysis in the paper is shaped by the conceptual frame used 
by A4EA which looks at context, mechanisms and strategies, and outcomes.  
 
Evidence is distilled from a wide range of sources including a macro-evaluation of over 50 of 
DFID’s social accountability interventions (see Annexe 1) and a desk-based review of case 
studies on SPA and empowerment and accountability (E&A) in FCVAS (see Annexe 2). This 
evidence has generated relevant findings and questions in relation to what we know and 
what we don’t know about what works in supporting SPA to achieve outcomes in E&A.  
 
1.1 Key findings to have emerged 
 FCVAS present unique challenges for external actors in supporting SPA. 
Understanding the context is critical to making social and political action work. In the 
past external actors have pursued separate approaches in FCVAS but are now 
bringing together support for the reform of state institutions with support to civil 
society in building state-society relations. The evidence is limited, however the 
emphasis on avoiding imposing Western or generic models is well made in recent 
literature. 
 Approaches are evolving with external actors ‘thinking and working politically’. There 
is increasing attention amongst external actors for a more politically informed 
approach to E&A programming during both design and implementation. Growing 
evidence and practical guidance on how to operationally go about thinking and working 
politically is emerging. Evidence also points to the need to address existing power 
imbalances and to understand the significance of norms and perceptions of legitimacy.  
 Civil society organisations are key actors to support for E&A although the 
evidence shows that external actor support to civil society is more focused on 
empowerment than accountability. Studies point to core principles to guide good 
practice in civil society engagement. The evidence of external support to civil society is 
extensive with varying degrees of success. 
 There is a case for external actors to consider supporting ‘unruly’, spontaneous 
and cultural forms of action such as social movements and associations. 
Evidence suggests that more organic, membership-based movements are needed to 
secure changes in state-society relations and state institutions. This poses a challenge 
for external actors due to the unpredictability, politicisation and legality of such 
movements. But it is through social movements and associations that SPA can have 
the potential for inclusivity, in particular for women, girls and disadvantaged 
communities. While the evidence points to the value and importance of social 
movements and associations; it also questions whether such movements can truly 
lead to lasting change. 
 New social media also represents an opportunity for external actors to support 
spontaneous forms of SPA. There is recent and growing evidence of new social 
media being used as a tool for actors who are engaged in SPA. It presents innovative 
opportunities for external actors to support an enabling environment by creating 
linkages and bringing together major stakeholders. 
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 Evidence is inconclusive as to whether a direct or indirect approach to support for E&A 
achieves more tangible outcomes. External actors need to consider whether a 
more indirect approach is more appropriate – by supporting or building an 
enabling environment for SPA. There is emerging evidence that suggests that what 
works best are interventions which influence the contextual constraints for SPA. State-
citizen relationships in conflict-affected states are disproportionately shaped by indirect 
events and less by official channels, so external actors should identify and support 
citizens’ informal channels of communication with the state and analyse and adjust 
donor funding mechanisms, scale and trends in relation to their impact on state-society 
relations. 
 Applying a strategic, multi-faceted approach. There is a strong argument for 
external actors to move beyond short-term tools and tactics focused on one-sided 
engagement, towards more strategic, multi-pronged interventions that simultaneously 
tackle blockages within both state and society. The emerging evidence from case 
studies supports this viewpoint as does the macro-evaluation of over 50 DFID-funded 
E&A interventions (see Annexe 1). This latter evaluation confirms that ‘social 
accountability traps’ exist (i.e. improved local service delivery is almost always 
achieved by local social accountability processes but is more challenging to scale up 
or sustain) and the need to move beyond tactical approaches to achieve success at 
scale. E&A approaches should link the local to the national level to achieve outcomes 
at scale. 
 Target marginalised groups directly to leave no-one behind. The macro-evaluation 
of DFID E&A interventions found that social accountability programmes should get 
better at identifying and designing interventions for marginalised groups, whether for 
localised social accountability or for more ambitious, higher-level processes. 
 The evidence points to mixed results and outcomes in terms of ‘what works’ in 
E&A programming. While some of the earlier-dated evidence from macro-level 
studies and evaluations points to limited achievements (changes in practices and 
behaviours, gains made by more politically well-connected communities, public service 
improvements more at the local level, participation in local associations rather than 
state institutions), there are more positive conclusions from some of the more recent 
studies in the desk review (where initiatives are part of a wider government strategy, 
there is a focus on inclusion and rights-based approaches, or there is an emphasis on 
bringing together a wide range of actors).  
 
1.2 What are the gaps in the evidence? 
This paper concludes by looking at the gaps in the evidence and what this might mean for 
future research on E&A in FCVAS. Having briefly re-visited the A4EA theory of change, the 
paper identifies a number of research questions which need to be answered to address 
these gaps. These are structured around the A4EA frame: 
 
Context 
 
 How do frontline workers understand and use political economy analysis or political 
analysis in practice? 
 How are shifts in power dynamics or power balance understood, observed and 
measured by those implementing and participating in E&A programmes; and how can 
programmes avoid elite capture? 
 How are marginalised groups targeted in E&A programming? 
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Mechanisms and strategies 
 
 How are internal champions for citizen engagement within government identified, 
engaged and supported? 
 How can external actors engage constructively with social and political movements? 
 How are external actors able to support new social media in a way which is integrated 
with other support to SPA towards E&A? 
 How are multi-faceted approaches designed and employed in practice by frontline 
workers supporting SPA towards E&A. 
 
Outcomes 
 
 What examples do we have of scaling up of successful local initiatives; what can we 
learn from these examples? 
 How do social contracts between citizens and the state and similar concepts intersect 
with programming; in what circumstances does E&A programming strengthen or 
undermine those relationships? 
 How do external actors factor in social norms and perceptions of legitimacy in their 
programming? 
 Does adaptive programming for E&A in FCVAS work? 
 How can donor conditions and organisational arrangements be amended to better 
support adaptive programming? 
 
These research gaps and questions will be the subject of the wider A4EA research 
programme and in particular will be addressed by the specific research (led by Itad and 
Oxfam) on ‘Adaptive Programming for Empowerment and Accountability in Fragile, Conflict 
and Violence Affected Settings: What Works and Under What Conditions?’ 
 
 
2  Introduction: Scope and limitations of the 
paper 
 
Despite the considerable investment by external aid actors in empowerment and 
accountability (E&A) initiatives in the past decade, understanding is limited in terms of which 
approaches work, in which contexts and why. This paper explores how these actors 
(including multilateral, bilateral and international non-government organisations (NGOs)) 
have supported social and political action (SPA) in fragile, conflict and violence affected 
settings (FCVAS), to determine what we know about what works for E&A and under what 
conditions. The paper has been written as part of the Action for Empowerment and 
Accountability (A4EA) research programme, which explores how progressive SPA emerges 
in FCVAS settings, the pathways it takes and what impacts it has on E&A. This exploration 
of the theory of change towards E&A is designed to also provide practical and operational 
insights and lessons for how external actors can contribute to improving outcomes (theory of 
action1), as presented in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1  Here the theory of action means how a planned programme intervention is understood to contribute to political and 
 social change. 
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Figure 2.1: Theory of change and theory of action 
 
 
 
A number of definitions, theories and conceptual frames have been used to shape the A4EA 
research programme.2 
 
Figure 2.2: A theory of empowerment and accountability from A4EA 
programme business case 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The theory of change underpinning the A4EA research programme is that ‘empowered 
citizens who participate in social and political action will widen political settlements, 
strengthen the social contract between state and society, improve government 
responsiveness and provide space for previously excluded groups to participate in politics 
and hold government to account’ (DFID 2016a: 5). Figure 2.2 presents this theory as a 
virtuous circle.  
 
The definitions set out in the A4EA Inception Report3 include the following. ‘Social action’ 
refers to action taken in the social sphere to shift social norms, values, incentives and power 
that underpin social behaviour. ‘Political action’ means collective action undertaken by 
groups (or networks) for change in public policies or governance arrangements. 
‘Empowerment’ refers to a state of both subjective and objective being, where people have 
greater voice over decision making that affects their lives, an expanded range of choices and 
the possibilities of making them in the social, political and economic spheres, and increased 
control over their own lives (Green 2016; Eyben 2011). ‘Accountability’ refers to the process 
of holding actors responsible for their actions (Schedler 1999; Fox 2007). ‘External actors’ 
refer to multilateral and bilateral government partners, NGOs and private sector individuals 
                                                          
2  These are summarised in Annex 1. 
3  IDS (2017) ‘Action for Empowerment and Accountability Research Programme, Inception Report (April-November 
 2016)’. 
Citizen 
Participation & 
Inclusion 
increases 
Political 
Settlements 
widen 
Social 
Contract 
strengthens 
Government 
Responsiveness 
improves 
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and donors; although recognising that most literature relates to ‘external actors’ as donors 
and means multilateral and bilateral governments. 
 
To explore if and how change happens, the A4EA research programme has developed a 
context – mechanisms and strategies – outcome (CMO) conceptual framework to shape how 
the programme will look at the interaction of various factors of context (in relation to FCVAS), 
mechanisms and strategies of SPA, and outcomes. The relationship between these factors 
is understood from the outset to be interactive rather than linear. The key factors are listed in 
Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1: Linking contexts, social and political action and outcomes for E&A 
in FCVAS – key factors  
FCVAS context SPA mechanisms & 
strategies 
Outcome 
1. Fragmentation of 
authority 
2. Informal processes of 
power 
3. Closing civil society 
space and 
internalised fear 
4. Ethnic and 
intersecting identities 
5. Norms and 
perceptions of 
legitimacy 
1. Unruly, spontaneous 
and cultural forms 
2. Diverse and shifting 
entry points 
3. Cross-scale and multi-
partied coalitions 
4. New discourses and 
repertoires 
5. Norms and practices of 
inclusiveness 
Empowerment: 
1. Awareness of power and 
entitlements 
2. Capacity and resources for action 
3. Freedom to exercise agency 
Accountability: 
1. Delivery of public goods 
2. Norms of legitimacy and trust 
3. Capacity and commitment for 
responsiveness 
4. Inclusivity of outcomes 
 
This synthesis paper provides a general review of themes and questions relating to ‘what 
works’ raised within recent literature and studies, including a recent macro-evaluation of 
DFID’s E&A projects.4 All findings included within the paper are well-evidenced,5 however 
assessing the relative merits of the methodologies adopted to weight evidence included 
within these studies is beyond the scope of this paper. Each document or case study used 
within the synthesis report was assessed for relevance by researchers in terms of: the type 
of evidence provided (primary/observations, programme document, secondary/other); 
content (FCVAS, SPA, role of external actors) and quality of content (whether findings were 
based on field work; clarity of methodology; triangulation of evidence; number of interviews). 
 
In terms of other limitations, the paper is largely concerned with how external actors can 
support SPA in FCVAS rather than non-FCVAS. While this has helped narrow down the 
literature this is not an exhaustive review of all evidence and case study material. The study 
highlights examples of interventions funded by DFID, partly because of the focus of the 
macro-evaluation study and partly because a considerable amount of programming and 
evaluative work has been undertaken by DFID in the field of E&A. The study is also 
constrained by the fact that much of the literature on external actors focuses on donors, 
despite the wide range of other external actors potentially involved in supporting SPA, such 
as international NGOs, philanthropists and private sector organisations. The lack of 
information to support findings in relation to an expanded list of external actors represents a 
gap in the evidence and a possible focus for further research.  
 
                                                          
4  Itad (2016a) ‘Macro Evaluation of DFID’s Policy Frame for Empowerment and Accountability: Technical Report: What 
 Works for Social Accountability’, December, see summary Annex 1. 
5  Individual case studies which exemplify the themes or provide interesting exceptions have been included separately 
 as Annex 2. 
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Although it has not been possible to collate evidence against each factor, information within 
this paper is organised using the CMO conceptual frame adopted by the A4EA programme 
and keeps in mind the research programme’s core questions relating to each dimension of 
analysis: 
 
 Context: Under what conditions does citizen-based SPA lead to an inclusive 
empowerment of social groups (with special attention to women and girls)? 
 Mechanisms and Strategies: What kinds of citizen-based SPA contribute to building 
inclusive, open and accountable states and institutions (and which kind do not)? 
 Outcomes: How can we understand, measure and assess the impacts of such 
interventions to improve outcomes for development goals? 
 
3  Literature review: emerging themes and 
questions in relation to external actor 
programming   
This review of literature is supported by more detailed evidence from a synthesis of a macro-
evaluation of DFID E&A interventions (Annexe 1) and a review of a wide range of case 
studies presented in Annexe 2. 
 
3.1 Context 
Fragile, conflict- and violence-affected settings present a unique set of challenges for 
external actors in supporting social and political action 
 
There is widespread agreement that FCVAS present a unique set of challenges for external 
actors. These include: the lack of, or fragmentation of, state authority and institutions; 
weaknesses in the rule of law and protection of human rights; the dominance of informal 
systems and processes of power; restricted and violated spaces for civil society to operate; 
the importance of ethnic identity combined with weak notions of citizenship; and the 
significance of norms and perceptions of (state and non-state) legitimacy. Understanding 
these challenges and addressing them in programming to support SPA is critical. 
 
Fragility denotes a lack of trust between state and citizen and so although accountability 
initiatives are particularly needed, they are also particularly likely to flounder (McGee and 
Kroesschell 2013). In its 2011 World Development Report the World Bank emphasised two 
main approaches to be supported by external actors in moving from fragility and violence to 
stability and security: these are transforming institutions and restoring confidence. However, 
FCVAS can be volatile and subject to significant change with little warning; they are often 
characterised by weak formal institutions and strong informal institutions (e.g. traditional 
leaders or unelected village councils), which are challenging to hold to account. There may 
be only a narrow or narrowing political space within which citizens can exercise voice and 
agency (OECD 2015). The implications for locally-led social and political action are complex. 
On the one hand, FCVAS may create a climate of fear and despondency but on the other 
they may drive people to contest the status quo. The implications for external actors are 
complex too: in terms of identifying and working with SPA champions, external support in 
FCVAS carries the real risk of looking for safe engagement options and not tackling the 
‘spoilers’, and/or groups who are marginalised from the power base. This can translate into 
elite capture and can exacerbate existing power asymmetries, so aggravating perceptions of 
injustice among some groups (Grandvoinnet et al. 2015). But there are clear limitations on 
supporting and promoting inclusive political settlements. As one recent study indicates, 
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‘External actors will find it difficult….to directly influence internal political dynamics. It may 
thus be more effective to target international behaviour and initiatives that affect incentives 
such as management of extractive industries, international tax evasion and corruption’ 
(Haider with Mcloughlin 2016: 4).  
 
State-society relations are defined by DFID as:  
 
Interactions between state institutions and societal groups to negotiate how public 
authority is exercised and how it can be influenced by people. They are focused on 
issues such as defining the mutual rights and obligations of state and society, 
negotiating how public resources should be allocated and establishing different modes 
of representation and accountability.  
(DFID 2015: 15) 
 
Understanding the context is critical to making SPA work. In the past external actors have 
promoted state building by focusing on top-down approaches centred on formal institutions, 
but also encouraged peace-building by advocating for a bottom-up civil society approach. 
These two approaches have started to come together in building state-society relations, 
state legitimacy and the political and social fabric of society (Haider with Mcloughlin 2016), 
alongside a call for more comprehensive but flexible approaches to development assistance. 
 
In 2014 DFID commissioned Itad to conduct a macro-evaluation of its investments in E&A to 
inform policy and practice in DFID and other development organisations. Focusing on social 
accountability interventions, the macro-evaluation confirmed that context matters, specifically 
in relation to state-society relations. In terms of donor action, the study concluded that when 
state-society relations indicate a weak social contract, greater local level responsiveness is 
best achieved via informal citizen action (e.g. use of social media) and media oversight. 
Furthermore, in the context of a weak social contract, improving citizens’ knowledge of their 
entitlements is necessary to achieve increased formal citizen engagement with service 
providers. There was some evidence to suggest that working long term through existing 
organisations and networks, and through strong on the ground presence, created positive 
contributory conditions. In contexts of a weak social contract, supporting institutions that 
connect state and citizen was found to play an important role too. 
 
However, approaches are evolving – external actors are ‘thinking and working 
politically’ 
Current literature is heavy with endorsements for a more politically informed approach to 
programming. This suggestion is not entirely new – although the ideas it embraces are 
evolving. Ten years ago, in a review of the literature and donor approaches, O’Neill et al. 
(2007) suggested that donors can contribute positively to intermediate outcomes if they 
understand the politics better. They pressed for strategy and programming (including design, 
monitoring and evaluation) grounded in a thorough political economy analysis (PEA). Others 
have conveyed similar messages. Sharma (2009) made the case that political economy 
analysis particularly focusing on the impact of informal institutions, processes and actors 
(e.g. religious councils, social norms and traditional leaders respectively) should inform the 
design of E&A programmes. Wild & Harris (2011) recommend a thorough mapping of the 
key entry points for reform using political economy tools.  
 
Broadening the debate beyond the political, O’Meally (2013: 7-22), in a resource paper for 
the World Bank, points to six important macro elements or characteristics of context which 
can indicate the potential for success:  
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 Civil society: which has sufficient technical, organisational and networking capacity; 
authority, legitimacy and willingness to challenge authority 
 Political society: which exhibits a tendency towards democratisation, willingness to 
engage, rule of law 
 Inter-elite relations: since the nature and inclusiveness of political settlements to date 
sets a precedent for what might be possible in the future 
 State-society relations: since the nature of social contracts to date also sets a 
precedent 
 Intra-society relations: levels of inequality, social exclusion and fragmentation which 
are suggestive of what might be achieved 
 Global dimensions: donor-state relations; international political and economic drivers 
which offer important prompts for change.  
 
However, while such a list may help define the problem, it is not a solution.  
 
Given the challenging nature of FCVAS, the need for external actors to be politically savvy 
remains at the forefront of the development debate. The Itad macro-evaluation concluded 
that careful context/political economy analysis is crucial when designing and implementing a 
social accountability initiative. Practical guidance on how to work politically is emerging. Most 
recent attempts by external actors to ‘think and work more politically’ in response to a ‘live 
update’ on the political economy are discussed below in relation to new mechanisms and 
strategies. These approaches emphasise that aid should be more explicitly and assertively 
political, employing political goals and employing political means more extensively. Thus, it 
appears that connections are being strengthened not between specific contexts and 
successful outcomes but between specific approaches, mechanisms, strategies and 
successful outcomes. 
 
3.2 Mechanisms and strategies 
Organised civil society is a starting point – the key actors to support for 
empowerment and accountability 
 
Overall, external actors have sought to support SPA rather more towards empowerment 
than accountability and through funding related civil society organisations (CSOs) rather 
than movements. Rosanvallon (2008) identified three generic mechanisms through which 
civil society can hold the state accountable beyond, and independent of, electoral 
mechanisms. These have been adapted slightly to the context of FCVAS.  
 
 Oversight – the various means by which citizen organisations are able to monitor and 
publicise the behaviour of elected (or unelected) and appointed (or self-appointed) 
rulers 
 Prevention (or protection) – their capacity to mobilise resistance to, or support for, 
specific laws and policies (e.g. a constitutional amendment), agreements (e.g. return of 
stolen assets) or processes (e.g. holding an election), either before or after they have 
been implemented, and provide protection to uphold rights 
 Judgement – the trend toward “juridification” of politics when individuals or social 
groups use the courts and jury trials or traditional justice systems to bring delinquent 
politicians or militia leaders to judgement.  
 
Much has been written to guide good practice in civil society engagement. While the 
literature may be largely generic rather than specifically focused on FCVAS, it remains 
relevant to an understanding of the role of civil society in FCVAS contexts. For example, 
based on a synthesis of citizens’ voice and accountability initiatives, Menocal and Sharma 
(2008) offered core principles (several linked to context) for improved external actor 
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engagement in supporting social and political action towards empowerment and 
accountability:  
 
 Gather intelligence: build or sharpen political intelligence when developing policies or 
undertaking interventions 
 Work with what you have: work with the institutions you have and not the ones you 
wish you had, which will be more limited in FCVAS (new institutions can remain 
disconnected with members at the ground level and unrecognised by those with power 
at higher levels of authority; in FCVAS they could emerge in a way which entrenches a 
polarised position) 
 Build political skills: focus capacity building not only on technical skills but on political 
skills (although recognising the higher risks involved in FCVAS) 
 Address both supply and demand: place greater emphasis on mechanisms that 
address both sides of the (supply-demand) equation (while being realistic about what 
can be offered by the supply side in FCVAS) 
 Diversify engagement: diversify channels and mechanisms of engagement and work 
more purposefully with actors outside your comfort zone (which is potentially a higher 
risk in FCVAS).  
 
Also in the search for solutions, another macro-level report on countries recovering from 
episodes of violence pointed to basic principles and a toolkit of options which can be 
adapted to different contexts (World Bank 2011). From the evidence presented five 
approaches have been identified which have been used in different country circumstances to 
link rapid confidence-building measures to longer-term institutional transformation. These 
are:  
 
 Support for bottom-up state-society relations in insecure areas, such as combined 
community-based programmes for policing, employment and service delivery, and 
access to local justice and dispute resolution systems 
 Security and justice reform programmes that start with the basics and recognise the 
links between policing and civilian justice 
 Basic job creation schemes, including large-scale public works, addressing 
infrastructure bottlenecks, and expanding access to skills, finance, work experience 
and assets 
 Involving women in the design and implementation of security, justice and economic 
empowerment programmes 
 Focused anti-corruption actions to demonstrate that new initiatives and revenues can 
be well-governed, drawing on external and community monitoring capacity.  
 
In a similar vein, the Development Research Centre (DRC) on Citizenship, Participation and 
Accountability suggested six factors contributing to successful results (Citizenship DRC 
2011). First, the nature of the issue: where citizen demands are perceived to be within 
existing policy frameworks, they have greater chance of being heard through participatory 
modes of engagement. Where they challenge those frameworks, more contentious forms of 
protest may be needed. How issues are framed also appears important. In FCVAS it may be 
best to frame issues in relation to national and local rather than international norms, although 
in some contexts – such as anti-corruption – international norms can be more critical in 
incentivising elite groups to change practices and behaviours. Second, the institutional and 
political context: in FCVAS, citizen action may be largely restricted to grassroots 
associations, but if protected and integrated into national level processes these associations 
may make a crucial contribution to social cohesion and power dynamics. Third, the strength 
of internal champions: rather than try to measure the political will of government, an 
alternative is to determine whether there are champions for citizen engagement within the 
government. As the DRC states: ‘Working at the interface of state and society can mean 
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efforts to empower champions to build the necessary will to support those seeking change 
from the outside’ (Citizenship DRC 2011: 41). Fourth, prior citizen capabilities: in situations 
where citizen capabilities are weak – for example, to hold meetings, raise media attention, 
organise petitions – strengthening them through practice (rather than training) can make an 
important contribution to ultimate success. It is however important to recognise here the fear 
of reprisal, and that inaction might be a rational response. Fifth, the location of power and 
decision making: authority is held at many levels requiring a coordinated, multi-faceted and 
multi-level way of approaching citizen engagement. In FCVAS informal authority can be just 
as important as the formal levels which are likely to be more restricted. Finally, the history 
and style of engagement is important. Understanding what forms of engagement have 
worked in the past – for example by looking at the history of community-based organisations 
– is crucial to designing context-appropriate programmes. In FCVAS assessing why and how 
engagement has broken down – as well as where it has persisted – is critical to 
understanding in what could work.  
 
These studies set out different principles or options for improved actor engagement and 
adapting to context. Relevance towards FCVAS has been considered. Beyond recognising 
that context matters, the studies do not go beyond this to suggest explicitly what elements of 
external engagement and context seem to matter most. In FCVAS it is critical to consider the 
key principle of ‘do no harm’ which requires external actors to consider carefully who is being 
supported and who is not being supported, and the potential risks and consequences. In 
terms of determining and realising the potential for action however the Citizenship DRC 
authors suggest practical guidelines for both internal and external actors, as set out in Table 
3.1 below. This recognises that in making use of the matrix below the roles of stakeholders 
will differ according to the specific setting, for example in some fragile contexts the risks 
facing civil society in engaging in specific areas of accountability (most notably budget 
monitoring, oversight of legislation, anti-corruption) may be greater than in others.  
 
Table 3.1: The role of stakeholders in supporting social and political action 
Government officers 
and elected 
representatives 
NGOs and civil 
society actors 
Researchers Donors 
Recognise that citizen 
engagement – even if it 
is challenging and 
contentious – can build 
effective governance and 
better political leadership 
Assess the benefits 
and risks of various 
strategies of 
engagement 
Understand the 
importance of ‘seeing 
like a citizen’ in the 
research process 
Think ‘vertically’ as 
well as 
‘horizontally’ 
Go beyond an ‘invitation’ 
to citizens to participate 
Develop clearer 
strategies and 
policies for mediating 
and linking across 
actors 
Recognise that the ways 
of working on citizenship 
can be as important as 
the findings themselves 
Help to protect the 
space for citizen 
engagement, 
including for social 
movements 
Reach out to champions 
in other levels and areas 
of government 
For sustainable 
results, develop 
approaches that build 
the constituencies for 
change 
Build collaborative multi-
stakeholder and 
transnational 
partnerships to address 
complex global issues 
Give citizen 
engagement more 
time 
Source: Adapted from Citizenship DRC (2011) ‘Blurring the Boundaries: Citizen Action Across States and Societies. A 
Summary of Findings from a Decade of Collaborative Research on Citizen Engagement’ 
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Is there a case for external support to unruly, spontaneous and cultural forms of 
action – a more disruptive version of citizen activity? 
 
Some authors offer evidence that suggests that broad national membership-based 
movements are required to secure changes in state processes and institutions (Kabeer et al. 
2010; Htun and Laurel Weldon 2012). This poses a challenge to external actors, since 
historically, (Western) aid agencies have not paid much attention to what we term social 
movements and grassroots associations. This is largely because of their unpredictable 
nature, their overt politicisation and their tendency to engage in informal political activity  
(e.g. public demonstrations, use of social media). There is an observed paradox here in that 
social movements may prosecute the state for not ensuring that the rights of the people are 
upheld, by using radical and formally illegal types of protest to highlight the state’s own 
“illegality” (Earle 2008; 2011). This perspective is backed by a body of literature that argues, 
from a FCVAS perspective, why donors should not engage directly with social movements. 
This literature primarily rests on the premise that promoting or funding social movements 
leads to a dilution of purpose and a defection of membership (Haider 2009; Earle 2011). 
Work by Fernando (2012) supports this position arguing that donor funding ‘projectises’, 
depoliticises and co-opts a movement’s agenda. Should external actors choose to directly 
engage with social and political movements, authors emphasise the importance of 
minimising requirements and donor influence to not derail social and political movements 
from their original course (Castillejo 2009; Earle 2011; Haider 2009). 
 
But it is through social movements and associations that SPA can have the potential for 
inclusivity as they tend to draw together members from more marginalised or disadvantaged 
communities. Earle (2008) has made the case that the most appropriate ways of providing 
assistance are probably the least exciting but of greater benefit in the long run. This could 
involve supporting running costs for communication amongst members and other allies, and 
improving communications strategies, including through the internet, to appeal to new, 
younger members. Movements could also benefit from greater levels of internal organisation 
and recordkeeping, so that they can easily draw on their organisational history for future 
planning and strategising. Funding for support NGOs, that provide legal advice and media 
training could also help movement leaders take greater positive advantage from the 
newspaper and television coverage that their activities inevitably incur. Finally, movements 
would benefit from easy access to relatively small amounts of money, to fund ad hoc 
protests and emergency meetings. 
 
A more recent study by Maria Stephan (2016) has looked at how collective citizen action in a 
number of fragile and conflict affected states (e.g. Colombia, Liberia, Guatemala, Nigeria, 
Afghanistan) has played a key role in ‘challenging exclusionary, predatory governance and 
in advancing peace processes’ (2016: 1). Such action is often manifested in social 
movements which comprise of members (individuals and groups) which share a common 
identity and use tactics including marches, vigils, boycotts, sit-ins, strikes, monitoring, and 
other non-violent methods. Stephan has demonstrated how such movements can confront 
and encourage power-holders to open up new democratic spaces. As with other studies the 
research shows that such social movements tend to have historical legitimacy and draw 
upon a critical mass of supporters.  
 
Inclusivity requires supporting participation of all groups. From research covering 100 cases 
studies Gaventa and Barrett point to – albeit limited – evidence of ‘a greater sense of 
inclusion of previously marginalised groups; and a greater sense of social cohesion across 
groups. This is particularly important in fragile contexts or settings with historically high levels 
of horizontal inequalities, whether perceived or real’ (2010: 44). This is supported by 
research which shows that in FCVAS, local associations can play a critical role in 
strengthening cultures of citizenship (Citizenship DRC 2011). Case study evidence shows 
participation in these associations can expand the sphere of relationships in the lives of poor 
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people. This effect is particularly significant for women who are often confined to the limits of 
family. According to research exploring whether participation works, a World Bank report 
(2013b) makes the case that effective civic engagement does not develop within a 
predictable trajectory. Flexibility and patience are key. 
 
Building social cohesion is one of those intangible goals that some external actors have 
sought in their support to SPA towards E&A. There is emerging evidence for the building of 
trust between communities and between citizens and the state. Drawing on evidence from 
five fragile and conflict affected states, a World Bank study demonstrated how external 
actors have more chance at success in building social cohesion if they have understood 
social norms and legitimacy, how different groups have perceived fairness and justice, and 
design programmes that target inequality, promote tolerance and support community-driven 
projects and restore livelihoods (Marc et al. 2013).  
 
The question of whether donors have done too much or too little to support social 
movements has not gone away. Gaventa and Barrett (2010) concluded that although 
citizens may engage with the state in a variety of ways, associations and social movements 
are far more important vehicles than had been previously understood. Their view was that 
donors can play an important role in protecting and strengthening spaces for citizens to 
exercise their voice and can support the enabling conditions for citizen engagement. Donors 
can promote the value of broad social movements for development, support champions of 
engagement within the state and monitor state reprisals against increased citizen voice. For 
donors working in FCVAS, the research pointed to the need to recognise at an early stage in 
the engagement the role which local associations and other citizen-led activities can play in 
the strengthening of cultures of citizenship which foster responsive states. Of interest, was 
that more than two-thirds of the research studies within the Gaventa and Barrett review 
found that the weakest democratic settings were linked to associations. This finding, the 
authors suggested, had important implications for donors and activists who often assume 
that civil society presence in fragile settings is very weak or has little potential to be effective.  
New social media – how can or should external actors support spontaneous forms of 
social and political action?  
There is recent interest and mounting evidence of the success of temporary ‘flares’ of SPA 
which do not translate into organisational bureaucracies or mainstream processes. Such 
actions are supported in part by new developments in information and communication 
technologies changing how people share information and mobilise (Bennett and Segerberg 
2013). Social media platforms are emerging as important tools for social movements in the 
global south; the Arab Spring being the much-quoted example of this.  
 
There are many other examples. During the national strike over fuel subsidies in Nigeria in 
2012, elements of social media were widely credited with broadening the debate to include a 
discussion on corruption and in influencing the government to reach a compromise with the 
Nigerian Labour Congress (NSRP 2012). The Occupy Wall Street in the United States 
movement illustrates the potential of social media to spur activist engagement in the 
Northern hemisphere by providing an alternative source of information to traditional media 
and facilitating coordination (Clark 2012). During the Egyptian uprising in 2011, social media 
afforded opposition leaders the means to shape repertoires of contention, frame issues, 
propagate unifying symbols, and transform online activism into offline protests. While social 
media was not the singular cause of the uprising, it helped create a fertile context (Lim 
2012). In Taiwan, social media was credited with playing an instrumental role in both the 
organisation and mobilisation of the “Sunflower Movement” that was eventually successful in 
shaping the legislative’s agenda to prioritise an oversight mechanism (Chen et al. 2014). 
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A literature review by Buettner and Buettner (2016) analysed the role of Twitter during a 
range of social movements across the world and concluded that Twitter effectively connects 
people despite a ‘complex and non-linear social fabric’ (2016: 1). Although social media 
represents quick and inexpensive ways to generate grassroots support, mobilise protests 
and share information, media use is of course limited to those with access to technology. 
While mobile technology is increasingly accessible, there is a case to be made that it 
remains a tool beyond the reach of the most marginalised.  
 
The source material points to key findings and recommendations which external actors could 
consider in their programming to support social and political action. Social media 
applications can facilitate real-time data collection and utilisation (e.g. tactical mapping and 
reporting in emergencies and community planning). The state and civil society can use 
crowdsourced data to inform and monitor service delivery. A recent study on the role of 
crowdsourcing for better governance presents external actors with an opportunity to promote 
local ownership and participation in E&A initiatives. It is not however without its limitations as 
the study also notes that ‘The willingness and personal engagement of volunteers is based 
on a vision and specific objective that an official donor or government institution may not 
have. An initiative that is perceived to be externally driven will only work in an emergency, 
crisis, or similar short-term context’ (Bott et al. 2014). What external actors can do best is to 
find ways to cooperate with online communities and support the enabling environment by 
creating linkages and bringing together all major stakeholders.  
 
But would an indirect approach to external support be better – supporting or building 
an enabling environment for SPA? 
There is some evidence that providing grants to CSOs can lead to scattered portfolios of civil 
society activities which are difficult to scale up or link in a strategic way (ICAI 2013). This is 
because there are inevitable limits to the degree to which donors can identify complex 
dynamics in a foreign environment (Friedman and Reitzes 2001). The UNDP position 
however presented in ‘The Political Economy of Transitions Analysis for Change’ (2012b) 
suggests that donor funding has worked best where it has supported coordination among 
existing CSOs and acted as an intermediary between them and the government. Despite 
this, civil society-based policy support is seen to suffer from limited sustainability, association 
with international rather than local ideas and may lack a representation of diverse 
viewpoints. 
 
Synthesised work by Haider (2009) and Fernando (2012), both recommended that 
development partners should act more indirectly and systemically to strengthen the enabling 
environment for civil society and civil society movements. This they note could be achieved 
for example by: supporting mobilisation processes within civil society, protecting the right to 
form independent associations and the right to protest, and supporting social movements to 
communicate in public debates and to be visible within the media. This is in line with the 
findings of a literature review by Earle (2011) which also led to the conclusion that donors 
should concentrate on creating a supporting environment for social movements. This could 
include working with governments to avoid the criminalisation of all protest; helping to 
support a more accepting public sphere where different views can be expressed; engaging 
with government to protect freedom of speech and the right to protest; promoting avenues 
for state-society engagement early on during peacebuilding; and supporting the media to 
protect the right to protest and to draw public attention. 
 
Overall, the suggestion is that what works best is not external actor direct engagement with 
SPA actors but interventions which influence the contextual constraints such actors face. 
Specifically, external actors can focus on indirect approaches in fragile states. State-citizen 
relationships in FCVAS are disproportionately shaped by indirect events and less by official 
channels, so external actors should identify and support citizens’ informal channels of 
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communication with the state (e.g. community forums, use of social media) and analyse and 
adjust donor funding mechanisms, scale and trends in relation to their impact on state-
society relations. 
 
What about a multi-faceted approach? 
Fooks (2013) argues that E&A – particularly in FCVAS contexts – requires triangulation 
between civil society groups, other powerful non-state actors and the state. This triangulated 
approach, Fooks believes, nurtures the social contract. This approach can be seen to 
encourage cross-scale and multi-partied accountability coalitions, and promote a discourse 
and action based on bringing together a wide range of actors at the outset. Other authors 
agree that in these contexts, more traditional demand-led approaches are perceived as a 
challenge by nervous governments and so supporting SPA here carries more risk. More 
particularly, observers critical of social accountability interventions have highlighted the 
dangers of an absence of strategic higher-level support. Jonathan Fox notably describes an 
‘accountability trap’ in which contribution to improved services remains localised and short-
lived in the absence of strategic intervention (Fox 2014). The Itad macro-evaluation (2016a) 
confirmed such social accountability traps. There was clear evidence that improved local 
level service delivery is almost always achieved by local social accountability processes, but 
translating local social accountability processes into improved service delivery at scale was 
shown to be difficult to achieve beyond the geographical and administrative reach of the 
project.  
 
Based on the results of a systematic comparison of cases, Fox (2015) urges external actors 
to move beyond short-term tools and tactics focused on one-sided engagement and towards 
more strategic, multi-pronged interventions that simultaneously tackle blockages within both 
state and society. In what he calls ‘the sandwich strategy’ Fox invites external actors to 
deploy multiple tactics, encourage enabling environments for collective action for 
accountability, and coordinate citizen voice initiatives with reforms that bolster public sector 
responsiveness (Figure 3.1). Evidence from the Itad-led macro-evaluation suggested that 
supporting formal (invited) citizen engagement is necessary to achieve improved higher-level 
service delivery and needs to be part of a highly institutionalised and integrated approach. 
On the supply side, social accountability needs to be embedded in policy and programme 
frameworks, including channels for information to flow upwards. On the demand side, civil 
society needs to be coordinated and vertically integrated. Perhaps surprisingly, evidence 
from the macro-evaluation led to the rejection of the hypotheses that mechanisms supporting 
a mix of formal and informal citizen engagement are more likely to contribute to higher level 
service delivery. 
 
Citizen engagement functions in a world of multi-tiered governance in which international, 
national and local efforts can connect. Overall, this suggests the possibility of a combined 
strategy of working in invited spaces and enabling organic movements; working directly and 
indirectly; and working vertically and horizontally. 
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Figure 3.1: Fox’s sandwich strategy 
 
Source: Fox, J. (2015) ‘Social Accountability: What Does the Evidence Really Say?’, World Development, 72: 355 (revised and 
abridged version of GPSA Working Paper), CC BY 4.0 
 
 
3.3 Outcomes 
What does it all add up to? 
This section examines the findings of a number of macro-evaluations and meta-synthesis 
studies which have each contributed to the body of knowledge currently informing donor 
programming. The evolution of thinking is reflected sequentially in relation to publication 
date. While this section attempts to present headline findings in relation to ‘what works’, 
more specific examples are provided in Annexe 2. 
 
An ODI macro-evaluation of voice and accountability initiatives found that positive effects 
were mostly limited to changes in behaviour and practice, but that there was little evidence 
for a direct contribution to development or democracy (Menocal et al. 2008). A critical factor 
limiting the nature of results was understood to relate to donor expectations being too high 
and based on misguided assumptions around the nature of voice and accountability and the 
linkages between the two. However, Gaventa and Barrett’s mapping of outcomes of civil 
society engagement (2010) showed that 75 per cent of the 100 cases mapped in their study 
had made positive gains linked to the construction of citizenship, the strengthening of 
practices of participation, the strengthening of responsive and accountable states, and the 
development of inclusive and cohesive societies. 
 
Social accountability in service delivery has been shown to work with women and for 
women. UNIFEM’s landmark ‘Progress of the World’s Women Report’ (Goetz 2009) is a rich 
source of good practice in strengthening accountability for gender-responsive service 
delivery. The UNIFEM report, while describing access to services as a single rallying point 
for women’s collective action, cautions on the importance of understanding context, including 
those contexts where women’s relative powerlessness and lack of mobility results in 
women’s relationship to the public sphere being mediated by men so they effectively seek 
accountability ‘at one remove from states and markets’ (2009: 6). The 2016 Itad macro-
evaluation found that supporting socially inclusive platforms results in improved services for 
marginalised groups, with awareness playing a supporting role. Further, a conducive policy 
environment and targeted supply-side measures can contribute significantly. 
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A study looking at over 500 examples of interventions (government and donor-supported) 
that have sought to induce participation, including the World Bank’s effort to support 
participatory development, found generally positive results relating to participatory 
approaches – but emphasised that the main beneficiaries tend to be the most literate, least 
geographically isolated, and most politically well-connected communities. They found little 
evidence however that induced participation builds long-lasting cohesion. Even at the 
community level, group formation tends to be both parochial and unequal (Mansuri and Rao 
2012). 
 
In a review of the experience of participatory governance mechanisms as a strategy for 
increasing government responsiveness and improving public services, Speer (2012) 
assessed the evidence on the impact of such mechanisms as positive but limited. Overall, 
the reviewed literature suggests that the public policy benefits of participatory governance on 
government accountability and responsiveness remains to be proven and that implementing 
participatory governance effectively is likely to be a challenging enterprise in many places. 
Joshi (2013) found that donor support has been effective in empowering people but also 
found that the evidence on impact is more mixed. 
 
The aforementioned meta-analysis of 100 case studies of citizen engagement (Gaventa and 
Barrett 2010) identified citizen engagement in local associations as having the highest 
proportion of positive outcomes with both local associations and social movements scoring 
more highly than participation through formal governance structures. On the other hand 
another review of approaches to social accountability concluded that the evidence base was 
thin and uneven, often being based on speculative and even anecdotal information and 
sometimes reflecting institutional biases; that theories of change (ToC) were weak and 
incomplete, with gaps and missing links; that many evaluations assessed effectiveness 
(largely focused on output measures) rather than impact; and some claimed attribution 
where it was not plausible in a complex environment with multiple interventions (McGee and 
Kelbert 2013). 
 
Most recently several authors have reached more positive conclusions on what works. First, 
a 2013 World Bank review of more than 400 papers and books concludes that on balance, 
induced participation through community development or decentralisation initiatives is 
associated with improved government responsiveness, although the link between 
participation and service delivery outcomes is often vague (World Bank 2013a). Second, 
Houtzager and Joshi (2008) make the case that social accountability efforts which work are 
characterised by working across supply and demand, giving inclusion an explicit focus and 
adopting a rights-based approach. Finally, in line with this multi-faceted approach to 
engagement, some positive results have been achieved in FCVAS by adopting a social 
contract approach which emphasises the collective responsibility of all parties to support 
better development outcomes (Combaz and McLoughlin 2014).  
 
From the literature, we have seen that very broadly, SPA can be divided into two paradigms: 
‘induced’ efforts where the focus of external actors is on supporting a reform process and 
‘organic’ forms of SPA where external actors are responding to citizen-led actions. Figure 
3.2 below captures the key approaches advocated in the reviewed literature. These are 
approaches which external actors could consider in supporting SPA. The approaches should 
not be ‘treated’ in isolation. The literature points to the risks or failures of single approach 
initiatives, for example increasing access to information alone doesn’t lead to change (see 
for example Fox 2014) and working with the grain could simply entrench power imbalances if 
other strategies are not employed. Greater success is more likely when approaches are 
combined in a more strategic way. 
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Figure 3.2: External approaches to SPA 
 
 
4  Looking forward: what are the gaps and 
how might a new research programme fill 
them?  
From a review of the evidence – contained in Section 3 and Annexes 1 and 2 – we can 
identify a number of themes where questions and gaps remain. This section is concerned 
with how these questions and gaps could be addressed by the A4EA research programme. 
First however we look briefly at how the A4EA theory of change is tested against the 
evidence presented.       
 
4.1  What does this mean for the theory of change and conceptual framework  
for the Empowerment & Accountability Research programme? 
Overall our findings both corroborate and challenge elements of the theory of change for the 
A4EA research programme. It is worth repeating the theory underpinning the A4EA research 
programme:  
 
Empowered citizens who participate in social and political action will widen political 
settlements… strengthen the social contract between state and society… improve 
government responsiveness and… provide space for previously excluded groups to 
participate in politics and hold government to account.  
(DFID 2016a: 5) 
 
Empowered citizens who participate in social and political action will widen political 
settlements… 
Our findings challenge this element of the theory of change. There is significant evidence 
from our examination of organised civil society, social movements and new social media (in 
Section 3 and Annexe 2) that citizens are empowered through participating in SPA. These 
case studies suggest, however, that there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate 
empowerment alone leads to a deepening or a widening of the political settlement.  
Induced SPA
Organic SPA
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The macro-evaluation of E&A interventions (detailed in Annexe 1) confirms an ‘accountability 
gap’ at the local level which indicates a need to move beyond tactical approaches to achieve 
success at scale – and contribute to a widening of the political settlement. 
 
[Empowered citizens will] strengthen the social contract between state and society… 
There is a degree of confidence from the evidence on the context and involvement of civil 
society and social movements (in Section 3 and Annexe 2) that citizen-state relations can be 
improved through E&A interventions in the short term. It is however not sufficiently clear how 
this translates – or is understood – in strengthening the social contract between state and 
society in the long run. There is evidence from Section 3 and Annexe 2 that E&A can 
contribute to building awareness of rights between duty holders and duty bearers, and 
building social cohesion and trust. One recent study demonstrates that providing improved 
services, transparency and accountability which addresses people’s complaints can lead to 
more positive public perceptions of governance legitimacy (SLRC 2016). 
 
[Empowered citizens will] improve government responsiveness… 
The review of evidence – for example in relation to building an enabling environment which 
opens up democratic space in FCVAS, supporting multi-faceted approaches and local-level 
outcomes (in Section 3 and Annexes 1 and 2) – points to improvements in government 
responsiveness to E&A initiatives. The evidence indicates there are improvements in local 
service delivery. This can however be limited and short-term (as evidenced in Annexe 1 – 
Accountability Gap). Improved governance responsiveness is however more likely to be 
achieved where external actors provide specific (indirect) support to civil society and other 
non-state actors to engage with government and state institutions. There is also some 
evidence that elite groups do respond (and are incentivised to) to international norms and 
conventions in particular thematic areas (e.g. anti-corruption). Although in particular FCVAS 
contexts it is recognised that unrepresentative governments may not always be responsive – 
one recent study points out there is no consistent relationship between people’s access to 
basic services and their perceptions of local or central governance legitimacy (SLRC 2016). 
 
[Empowered citizens will] provide space for previously excluded groups to participate 
in politics and hold government to account. 
Our findings demonstrate that supporting the enabling environment – as evidenced in 
Section 3 and Annexes 1 and 2 – is a critical area in which external actors can make a 
difference. While it does require an understanding as to why excluded groups have been 
excluded – including how and why powerful and empowered groups may not favour opening 
up the space for excluded groups – the evidence suggests that external actors can make a 
difference by targeting specifically marginalised or excluded groups at the local level and in 
strategic level programming. 
 
4.2   What do we still need to know? 
4.2.1 Context 
1. A deep understanding of the political, economic and social context is critical in the 
design and implementation of E&A programmes to recognise: specific interests and 
incentives; the role that formal institutions and the more ‘informal’ social, political and 
cultural norms can play; values and ideas; and drivers and actors. In programming for 
E&A it is important to understand how politics can change rapidly in FCVAS – and 
demonstrate an ability to react and adapt. There is a growing emphasis in the 
literature on calling for external actors to think and work politically and be able to adapt 
rapidly to changes in the political environment (see evidence presented in Annexe 2 – 
Context). At the same time, they need to be realistic about what can be achieved and 
what can change in the lifetime of a specific intervention – particularly given the drive for 
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short-term funding and immediate results. While there is strong evidence that external 
actors are employing and using political economy analysis tools and methods in the 
design of programme interventions there is less evidence in how this understanding of 
the political economy is understood and used in practice on a regular basis by those 
who are at the frontline implementing programmes. External actors need to be thinking 
and working politically as they are starting to understand how this influences the 
effectiveness of their interventions. This requires external actors to be engaged with key 
stakeholders (state and non-state) on a continuous basis, be prepared to resource 
ongoing political analysis, and ensure real-time learning and feedback from the 
interventions. As a result, aid should be more explicitly and assertively political.  
 
Research Gap: how are frontline workers understanding and using political economy 
analysis or political analysis in practice?  
 
2. Case study evidence (see Annexe 1 – Accountability Trap) on how power is analysed 
and how external actors employ specific mechanisms to address power imbalances 
suggests that E&A interventions do not demonstrate significant shifts in power 
dynamics between elite groups and marginalised groups. Some of the case studies 
even postulate there can be a ‘capture’ of the E&A process by elite groups (see 
evidence in Annexe 2). This could be due to over-ambitious goals and objectives of the 
external actors in what could be expected from a programme with a duration of three to 
five years. Changes in the balance of power within a society are generational. What is 
critical therefore is a realistic understanding of the context of power relations in a society 
and in a community and what change is realistic in the short term. The evidence 
however on how the power balances have or have not changed, how they are 
addressed by frontline workers (e.g. civil society actors and others who are those 
supporting and implementing SPA interventions) and whether elite groups have 
captured the processes of E&A, is not sufficiently rigorous. It comes across as more 
circumstantial evidence. 
 
Research Gap: how do frontline workers understand power dynamics; how are shifts in 
power dynamics or the power balance understood, observed and measured by those 
implementing and participating in E&A programmes; and how can programmes avoid elite 
capture? 
 
3. Following on from this is the need to understand how marginalised and 
disadvantaged people experience accountability and empowerment initiatives. It is 
important to understand their experiences and views on E&A activities which are 
‘introduced’ and those which develop more organically from the community or group 
itself. For marginalised groups to benefit from E&A interventions however there is 
evidence which points to the need for programmes to be focused exclusively on 
targeting specific marginalised groups (see for example evidence in Annexe 1 – Socially 
inclusive service delivery).     
 
Research Gap: how are marginalised groups targeted in E&A programming? 
 
4.2.2  Mechanisms and strategies 
4. Organised civil society is a key actor in E&A. Evidence suggests it represents a 
starting point for external actors to support (see Annexe 2 – Mechanisms and 
Strategies). Civil society provides multiple roles in E&A: oversight, prevention (and 
protection), and judgment. At the same time, civil society may not always be closest to 
the most marginalised and may have vested interests. Moreover, civil society on its own 
cannot make E&A interventions a success. This requires civil society engagement with 
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other actors, state and non-state, and identifying who are champions for citizen 
engagement. These latter stakeholders are less well known and understood. 
Research Gap: how are internal champions for citizen engagement within government 
identified, engaged and supported? 
 
5.  There is emerging evidence however that external actors need to consider supporting 
unruly, spontaneous and cultural forms of action (see Annexe 2 – Mechanisms and 
Strategies). These are epitomised by social movements and associations which are 
different from organised civil society. By their very nature they are more challenging for 
external actors to support. They may not welcome external support especially from 
donors, less so from international NGOs. From the case study evidence, we need a 
better understanding of how external actors can engage more effectively with social and 
political movements and other member-based groups.  
Research Gap: how can external actors engage constructively with social and political 
movements? 
 
6.  The role of the mainstream media is seen increasingly by external actors as having an 
important ‘oversight’ or ‘watchdog’ role in accountability interventions. With regards to 
new social media it is seen as a more spontaneous form of SPA – considered by most 
case studies as a ‘tool’ to be used by actors many of whom do not belong to political 
parties or organised civil society. Evidence points to the value of both types of media – 
but not to be supported in isolation (see Annexe 2 – Mechanisms and Strategies). 
Research Gap: how are external actors able to support new social media in a way which is 
integrated with other support to social and political action towards empowerment and 
accountability? 
 
7.  There is evidence that external actors can play a critical role in creating or strengthening 
an enabling environment for SPA to take place. This indicates that indirect support is 
potentially a more viable option for external actors rather than directly supporting 
actions. There is also growing evidence that a multi-faceted approach is a way forward 
for external actors in their programming for E&A. This approach however needs to be 
tested more rigorously at the field level as external actors employ a range of approaches 
which bring together a broad set of actors, support collective action and combine formal 
and informal approaches. (See evidence presented in Annexe 1 – Social accountability 
and the social contract and in Annexe 2 – providing indirect support under Mechanisms 
and Strategies). 
Research Gap: how are multi-faceted approaches designed and employed in practice by 
frontline workers supporting SPA towards E&A? 
 
4.2.3  Outcomes 
8.  Much of the evidence points to successes of E&A interventions at the local level. 
Evidence from the macro-evaluation however points out that these local achievements 
are difficult to sustain, and that they are unlikely to be scaled up to the national level 
(see Annexe 1). One influential study talks of an ‘accountability gap’ which is confirmed 
by the macro-evaluation which recommends external actors apply a strategic approach 
to social accountability (Fox 2014). 
Research Gap: what examples do we have of scaling up of successful local initiatives; what 
can we learn from these examples? 
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9.  There are a range of approaches which set about building state-citizen relations in 
FCVAS. The evidence points to mixed successes. There is evidence of building social 
cohesion and trust (see Annexe 2 – Mechanisms and Strategies). Deeper analysis of 
how relationships change and alter between the state and its citizens in FCVAS is 
required. It is not clear how E&A programmes understand, relate and adapt to the social 
contract between citizens and the state. 
Research Gap: how do social contracts between citizens and the state and similar concepts 
intersect with programming; in what circumstances does E&A programming strengthen or 
undermine those relationships?  
 
10.  External actor support to E&A can contribute to a change in social norms and 
perceptions of legitimacy. Evidence of how they contribute however is limited to a small 
number of case studies which focus on these areas (see Annexe 2 – Mechanisms and 
Strategies).  
Research Gap: how do external actors factor in social norms and perceptions of legitimacy 
in their programming? 
 
11.  We have seen that there is much hype given to new models of development 
programming that are iterative, adaptive and politically grounded and attention as 
to whether they show greater promise than more traditional development approaches. 
Among the myriad of possible models, the current E&A programming paradigm 
suggests that external actors should think and work in a politically smart way, work with 
the grain, make small bets, adopt problem driven locally led approaches and as a result 
do development differently. These approaches or principles offer new or repackaged 
signposts to programming success, including developing a stronger understanding of 
how political, economic and social contexts play out in situations of complexity and 
fragility and a commitment to learning by doing. Evidence of adaptive programming is 
however thin on the ground – in relation to how such approaches have been put into 
practice, what has worked and not worked, the underlying factors that enable their 
effective implementation, how they contribute to success and the added value they 
provide. The current literature is relatively sparse and appears overly removed from the 
reality that practitioners face and is couched in a ‘donor-centric’ language that frontline 
workers, who ultimately must translate concepts into delivery, struggle to understand.  
Research Gap: does adaptive programming for E&A in FCVAS work? 
 
12.  Donors face internal organisational limitations to the interventions they may choose to 
make. Donors are bound by the need to disburse large grants, regulatory arrangements 
in relation to delivery, results reporting and value for money performance (which are 
subject to public scrutiny and challenge) and high staff turnover. According to 
Derbyshire and Donovan (2016: 3), ‘Many of the operational systems in place in donor 
organisations and suppliers (as well as supplier incentives) have been established to 
ensure accountability, compliance and value for money. These systems rely on pinning 
down details of work plans, budgets and personnel inputs up front and delivering against 
these and this approach effectively closes down the space and flexibility’. These do not 
translate easily into the contractual implications of adaptive programming. 
Research Gap: how can donor conditions and organisational arrangements be amended to 
better support adaptive programming? 
 
The gaps in research and evidence which have been presented above support the need for 
deeper and more targeted research. These questions are being reflected upon and are 
informing the A4EA research programme including a specific research project to be 
undertaken by Itad and Oxfam in 2017-18: ‘Adaptive Programming for Empowerment and 
Accountability in Fragile, Conflict and Violence Affected Settings: What Works and Under 
What Conditions?’. 
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Annexe 1 DFID macro-evaluation: conceptual 
framework and hypotheses 
In 2014, DFID commissioned a macro-evaluation of its investments in E&A. The main 
purpose was to generate learning about what works, for whom, in what contexts and why, in 
order to inform policy and practice in DFID and other development organisations. The 
analysis focused on social accountability (SAcc) approaches to E&A and was carried out by 
Itad. 
 
The macro-evaluation understood social accountability to comprise the range of 
mechanisms that informed citizens (and their organisations) use to engage in a constructive 
process of holding a government to account to its actions and helping it to become more 
effective (Malena et al. 2004). Proponents believe that when citizens engage in SAcc 
processes, their views are more likely to be heard and to influence government policy and 
service delivery, leading to better quality services (World Bank 2003). However, observers 
more critical of SAcc interventions have highlighted the dangers of an absence of strategic 
higher-level support. Jonathan Fox notably describes an ‘accountability trap’ in which SAcc’s 
contribution to improved services remains localised and short-lived in the absence of 
strategic intervention (Fox 2014). 
 
The macro-evaluation utilised a CMO (Context, Mechanisms, Outcomes) conceptual 
framework to shape hypotheses based on a combination of project screening and literature 
review. These hypotheses were then tested against DFID financed projects to produce a 
‘narrative analysis’ based on the strength of evidence that supported the hypothesis that 
particular causal mechanisms predictably lead to E&A outcomes in specific contexts. Figure 
A1.1 provides a simplified version of these hypotheses. 
 
There is some (although limited) overlap between the Itad macro-evaluation and the CMO 
factors of interest to the A4EA research programme, specifically in relation to inclusivity, 
diverse entry points, informal citizen action (e.g. through social movements and social 
media), responsiveness and delivery of services/public goods. 
 
As a first step in the macro-evaluation process, Itad conducted a literature review which 
identified a number of consensus issues from the academic and practitioner literature 
relevant to SAcc interventions. Significant amongst these were that service delivery failures 
stemming from weak public-sector accountability, are at root a political economy challenge 
as much as a technical one. Further, activating ‘political voice’ is more likely to emerge when 
citizens organise collectively around issues that immediately affect their lives and often the 
barrier to citizen action is the lack of capacity for collective action itself (Joshi 2013). Support 
for accountability processes can have an empowering effect on women’s political voice and 
capacity for collective action, but this effect is mediated by gendered social norms and the 
gendered division of labour. Transparency and access to information are necessary and 
have an inherent value, but are insufficient on their own to stimulate action (voice), and 
thereby accountability. Working on both voice and accountability more consistently and 
systematically is more effective than working on one alone and assuming that it will lead to 
the other. 
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Figure A1.1 Hypotheses explored within the Itad macro-evaluation 
 
 
The operational implication for donors, according to this literature review, is that they must 
think and intervene in state-society relations in a way which goes beyond citizen participation 
as the empowerment of subordinate outside groups. The Itad macro-evaluation team found 
that DFID is already aware of the suggestion to shift from demand-side programming to a 
multi-faceted approach. This policy position reflects Fox’s coining of the distinction between 
‘tactical’ (bounded, society-side and information-focused) and ‘strategic’ (multiple tactics, 
encouraging enabling environments and coordinating citizen voice with governmental 
reforms to bolster institutional responsiveness) approaches to accountability. It also takes 
note of Fox’s conclusion that a narrow focus on tactical approaches results only in localised 
and short-term SAcc impacts. Further to this, the desk review observed a growing 
consensus that donors need to be more realistic about what can be achieved in the shorter 
term, and to extend funding horizons as much as possible. 
 
DFID’s conceptualisation of E&A was found to have been shaped by empirically supported 
theoretical influences, some of which chimed with the above; in particular, a renewed 
emphasis on the political nature of E&A interventions and a notion of inclusive development, 
in which nations are built sustainably and successfully on principles of inclusion, participation 
and collective action. Additionally – and significantly for the macro-evaluation – DFID 
thinking on accountability and the pursuit of political outcomes embraced economic 
empowerment. This expansion of empowerment in accountability terms focused on market 
accountability and economic entitlement, the transference of economic assets and skills to 
the poorest and a focus on the enabling environment for economic empowerment.  
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The meta-evaluation team created a ‘meta’ theory of change reflecting DFID’s position that 
mapped entry points, processes and outputs through which poor people are enabled to have 
choice, to challenge and to change through action in state, society and market (see Figure 
A1.2). DFID’s conceptualisation of E&A continues to evolve around the three overlapping 
lenses of social accountability, political accountability and economic accountability.  
 
In terms of what works, the literature review found a lack of convincing evidence that social 
accountability initiatives have led to any significant shifts in deeper accountability and power 
relationships or benefitted the poorest and most marginalised (Westhorp et al. 2014). 
Tactical and apolitical social accountability approaches appear not to have lived up to 
expectations, underestimating the durability and effects of power structures that both 
constrain citizens from taking action and impede those who work for the state or service 
providers from responding. Secondly, evidence suggested that assumptions underpinning 
theories of change have expected too much of the complex mechanisms that influence how 
information and messages from different sources are accessed and engaged with. In 
response to this, there is implicit support for thinking politically both in the ICAI (2013) 
evaluation of DFID’s E&A programme as well as DFID’s internal E&A reviews. However, 
there is a suggestion that DFID’s own political economy, especially the spending pressure 
and demand for results, is preventing the broad application of its E&A programme in 
practice. 
 
The macro-evaluation highlighted a few significant evidence gaps specifically in relation to: 
how different groups of poor and vulnerable people experience social accountability issues 
and initiatives; the role of oversight institutions, particularly the media in enhancing 
accountability; whether political thinking approaches to donor support for E&A programmes 
make a difference; whether expanded or invited national or provincial level forums/inclusive 
deliberative spaces are effective; whether and how broad based coalitions effect progressive 
policy processes and enable more effective horizontal linkages with accountability actors 
such as parliaments, legislatures and supreme audit authorities; how DFID can better 
understand and respond to the dilemmas and challenges caused by spending pressure, 
demand for evidence of results etc. 
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Figure A1.2: DFID theory of change for E&A (macro-evaluation interpretation) 
 
Source: Kate Bishop (from Macro-Evaluation of DFID’s Policy Frame for Empowerment and Accountability; Empowerment and 
Accountability Annual Technical Report, 2016: What Works for Social Accountability?, Annexe Vol 1, Itad, December 2016b: 9). 
Reproduced with kind permission. 
 
To help fill some of these gaps, the macro-evaluation selected 50 projects, broadly 
representative of DFID’s social accountability portfolio, and used these to test 17 hypotheses 
structured around an examination of causal configurations of factors (or conditions) in 
relation to context (C), intervention mechanism (M) and outcome (O). Within this approach, 
contextual analysis focused on status-society relations while analysis of mechanisms and 
outcomes focused on if and how particular types of E&A intervention translated into 
enhanced access to and delivery of services and more specifically improved outcomes for 
marginalised groups. Hypotheses were clustered under three headings: the Accountability 
Trap; Socially Inclusive Service Delivery and Social Accountability and the Social Contract. 
The methodology and findings were quality assured through an EQUALS (Evaluation Quality 
Assurance and Learning Services) review. 
 
A1.1 Findings: hypotheses testing 
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processes. This is relevant to DFID projects that focus support to demand-side citizen 
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evaluations did not find evidence that these collectively contributed to an improvement of 
service at scale. There was insufficient evidence to distinguish between the efficacy of 
working with formal (invited) and informal (uninvited) space, although there was some 
evidence that formal space is essential, while informal space and support to skilled 
facilitators with close community links can play a reinforcing role. 
 
Analysis of the broader case studies suggested that formal institutionalised networking can 
promote at-scale service delivery improvements and that institutionalised coordination could 
also explain the difference in outcome achievement. However, overall, translating local SAcc 
processes into improved service delivery at scale was shown to be difficult to achieve 
beyond the geographical and administrative reach of the project. This finding is particularly 
relevant to DFID SAcc interventions which attempt to bridge the gap between micro-level 
intervention and macro-level policy changes. Micro-level intervention involves supporting 
discussions between service users and service providers at facility level about the quality of 
service delivery. Macro-level intervention involves supporting the enabling environment of 
policies and governance arrangements that enable citizens to claim their rights to services. 
Analysis concluded that feeding evidence and learning into processes of higher level 
legislative and policy change is neither necessary nor sufficient. An upward flow of 
information involves introducing evidence on service delivery outcomes and impact into 
higher level discussions. 
 
Evidence did suggest that the outcome of services at scale can be achieved if SAcc 
processes are embedded in policy or programme frameworks. Programmes cited to support 
this suggestion were the Rights and Governance Challenge Fund/Creating Opportunities for 
the Poor and Excluded Programme (RGCF/COPE) in Bangladesh (2014-16) and the Rural 
Water Supply Programme (RWSP) in Tanzania (2012-15). RGCF/COPE promoted citizen 
engagement through collective rights awareness and support to mobilisation. A recent 
evaluation showed that the programme achieved higher level service delivery outcomes with 
for example 129,000 households benefiting from social safety nets and 46,500 additional 
children completing primary school. RWSP was designed to improve and sustain 
government policy implementation of its Water Sector Development Programme (WSDP). 
RWSP achieved higher level service delivery outcomes including a contribution of 960,000 
to an additional 6.6 million people being provided with access to improved water services. 
Despite these examples, the macro-evaluation concluded that the evidence is not strong 
enough to develop a refined theory for testing. The main risks to service delivery outcomes 
were found to be supply-side resources and capacity. 
 
Findings were translated into a number of operationally relevant conclusions in relation to 
achieving improvements at scale: 
 
 SAcc is much more effective in achieving improved local level (project area) service 
delivery than improved higher level (at scale) service delivery 
 Supporting formal (invited) citizen engagement is necessary to achieve improved 
higher level (at scale) service delivery 
 Supporting formal (invited) citizen engagement needs to be part of a highly 
institutionalised and integrated approach to achieve higher level (at scale) service 
delivery 
 On the supply side, SAcc needs to be institutionalised and embedded in programme 
frameworks, including channels for information to flow upwards 
 On the demand side, civil society needs to be coordinated and vertically integrated. 
 
Socially inclusive service delivery 
The macro-evaluation explored strategies to reach marginalised groups and make sure that 
service delivery improvements include them. The study found that supporting socially 
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inclusive platforms results in improved services for marginalised groups, with awareness 
raising playing a supporting role. Further, a conducive policy environment and targeted 
supply-side measures can contribute significantly. 
 
One programme examined was the Partnership for Transforming Health Systems (PATHS) 
2, Nigeria (2008-14). PATHS2 achieved improved services for marginalised groups, in 
particular women and girls. There were significant increases in the proportion of births 
attended by skilled birth attendants for example. A modelling study showed that PATHS2 
contributed to saving over 100,000 lives from 2008 to 2014. Another programme, the 
Reducing Maternal and Neonatal Deaths in Rural South Africa through Revitalisation of 
Primary Health Care programme (RMND), 2011-16, supported the national strategy for 
maternal, newborn, child and women’s health and nutrition at national and district levels. 
However, there were inconsistencies in the findings for where programmes did not focus 
wholly on marginalised groups. For example, the Drivers of Accountability Programme (DAP) 
in Kenya (2010-16) did not achieve service delivery improvements for marginalised groups. 
This programme aimed at improving accountability of Kenya’s government to its citizens by 
providing technical assistance to county assemblies and by empowering citizens. DAP 
established and strengthened several socially inclusive platforms. While service delivery 
improvements were reported, however, none directly impacted on marginalised groups. 
 
Social accountability and the social contract 
Hypotheses in this area of study focused on the social contract6 between state and citizen 
and explored the role that media engagement plays in improving formal and informal citizen 
engagement in SAcc relationships in contrasting contexts of weak and strong social 
contracts. The macro evaluation found that when state-society relations indicate a weak 
social contract, greater local-level responsiveness is best achieved via informal citizen action 
and media oversight. Further, in the context of a weak social contract, improving citizens’ 
knowledge of their entitlements is necessary to achieve increased formal citizen 
engagement with service providers. The study found that a strong social contract alone was 
sufficient for the service delivery outcome to be achieved. There was some evidence to 
suggest that working long term through existing organisations and networks and through a 
strong on the ground presence created positive contributory conditions. In contexts of a 
weak social contract, supporting institutions that connect state and citizens was found to play 
an important role too.  
 
Programme examples contributing to these findings included the Foundation for Civil Society 
Programme (FCSP), Tanzania (2008-15) and the Public Policy Information, Monitoring and 
Advocacy (PPIMA) programme, Rwanda (2009-18). The Tanzania programme operated in a 
relatively weak social contract context. The political liberalisation of the early 1990s in 
Tanzania had failed to translate into meaningful citizen participation during FCSP’s lifetime. 
The programme awarded multiple small grant sub-projects on a competitive basis to 
NGOs/CSOs working on demand-side citizen awareness raising and CSO capacity building. 
FCSP achieved improvements in local level responsiveness; for example, the Mvomero 
District Development Committee was successfully lobbied to establish the District Education 
Fund for improving levels of education, specifically targeting female students. As a result, the 
formed committee is in the process of establishing hostels for girls in each secondary school 
across the district. The Rwanda PPIMA programme also operated in a weak social contract 
context; political space had remained relatively controlled and closed to citizen engagement, 
despite a progressive policy environment of decentralisation. The programme supported 
CSOs at national and local level to hold government to account and influence the formulation 
and implementation of policies and plans. Of interest is that the macro-evaluation rejected 
the hypothesis that in a state society context with a weak social contract, improving citizens’ 
                                                          
6  Understood to be the voluntary agreement reached between state and society for mutual benefit. 
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knowledge of their entitlement and/or improving their capacity to monitor services will 
increase formal citizen engagement with service providers. In weak social contract contexts, 
programme support to SAcc processes were undermined by failure to support institutions 
which connect state and citizens.  
 
Overall, looking across the projects, formal citizen engagement was found to be the main 
driver of greater local level responsiveness when sufficient entitlements were associated 
with service delivery and when limits to freedom of expression constrained informal action as 
the main driver of SAcc processes. 
 
A1.2 Conclusions 
The macro-evaluation reached a number of conclusions on the basis of its findings: Firstly, 
that SAcc is much more effective in achieving improved local level (project area) service 
delivery than improved higher level (at scale) service delivery. Further, supporting formal 
(invited) citizen engagement is necessary to achieve improved higher level (at scale) service 
delivery. To achieve improved higher level (at scale) service delivery, there is illustrative 
evidence that supporting formal (invited) citizen engagement needs to be part of a highly 
institutionalised and integrated approach. On the supply-side, SAcc needs to be 
institutionalised and embedded in policy or programme frameworks, including channels for 
evidence to flow upwards. On the demand-side, civil society needs to be well coordinated 
and vertically integrated. SAcc can achieve improved services for marginalised groups if 
socially inclusive platforms are supported. Awareness raising can play a supporting role. 
Illustrative evidence suggests that in some cases SAcc is not sufficient and needs to be 
complemented by supply-side measures specifically targeting marginalised groups. When 
there is a weak social contract, greater local level responsiveness is best achieved by 
informal citizen action, with media oversight playing a supporting role. Formal citizen 
engagement is best increased through improving citizens’ knowledge of their entitlements. 
The analysis also indicates that formal citizen engagement can be increased through 
working long term through existing organisations and networks and through a strong on-the-
ground presence. Perhaps inevitably, a strong social contract was found, by itself, to be a 
strong driver of formal citizen engagement. 
 
The macro-evaluation generated three signposts to effective SAcc programming for DFID 
based on these findings:  
 
1. Apply a strategic approach to social accountability; analysis confirms the social 
accountability traps identified by Fox (2014) and the need to move beyond tactical 
approaches to achieve success at scale. SAcc approaches should link the local to the 
national level to achieve outcomes at scale.  
2. Target marginalised groups directly to leave no-one behind; in support of this 
targeted approach SAcc programmes should get better at identifying and designing 
interventions for marginalised groups, whether for localised SAcc or for more 
ambitious, higher-level processes.  
3. Consider the context and think and work politically; project context influences the 
effectiveness of SAcc initiatives; this means that careful context/political economy 
analysis is crucial when designing a SAcc initiative and that implementation also 
requires thinking and working politically to adapt to contexts which change. 
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Annexe 2 Case studies: examples and exceptions 
Within this annexe, we now consider the evidence we have of what works in relation to these 
emerging themes within the frame of context, mechanisms and strategies, and outcomes 
and based on specific case studies. One major caveat is that this is not an exhaustive review 
of evidence but draws on over 40 case studies both multi-country and single country (see 
bibliography). 
 
A2.1 Context 
External actors are adapting to the challenging context of FCVAS in their support to 
SPA 
Evidence of what works in terms of external actors focusing on building state-society 
relations is relatively limited. One study on the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and 
State building in Timor-Leste demonstrates what is required – focus on how things are done 
(the process) as much as what is done (the results). In this case, civil society emphasised 
the importance of inclusive and participatory processes to address conflict and build the 
state (Interpeace 2010). Contrast this to another case study from Timor-Leste – on the Asia 
Foundation’s local governance reform programme – which highlighted tensions within the 
theory of change between programme approaches and improving state-society relations. 
Raising village activism was seen to have led to conflict not consensus, demonstrating that 
‘Reforming state-society relations cannot be achieved via a solely technical approach to 
local, governance, but requires both deeper and wider political engagement across society 
and state as a whole’ (Rowland and Smith 2014 cited in Haider with Mcloughlin 2016: 1). 
Understanding the context is critical.  
 
Evidence on what works in terms of confidence building from the 2011 World Bank macro-
evaluation report described how community-level programme design can be adapted to 
country context in seven FCVAS countries: Afghanistan, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, 
Indonesia, Nepal, Rwanda. The more successful initiatives aimed to re-establish credible 
participatory forms of representation, ensure building trust and a transparent control and use 
of funds, and alignment between community decision-making structures and the formal 
government administration. As with other macro-level studies the above report points to the 
importance of involving women in the design and implementation of programmes in 
rebuilding the state and in post-conflict settings. This is mirrored in a study on how gender is 
integrated in state building initiatives (Castillejo 2011). The study looked at how women in 
five FCVAS countries (Burundi, Guatemala, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Sudan) have largely 
been excluded by existing elites from post-conflict negotiations. The study indicates that 
where there have been opportunities women have been relatively successful in influencing 
political reform. External actors however have tended to neglect addressing the power 
dynamics that have excluded women. 
 
There is some evidence of success in relation to supporting efforts to change social norms 
(e.g. DFID, Voices for Change 2016b). This approach can be seen in the design of recent 
political accountability and anti-corruption programmes in Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda, for 
example, which pay attention to the incentives of elite groups to change behaviour and alter 
social norms around what is acceptable and not acceptable. There could be more traction in 
supporting political action to improving accountability through external actor support to 
countries (governments and civil society) to engage in international initiatives such as the 
Internal Reporting Mechanism of the Open Government Partnership (OGP), the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and Universal Periodic Review (UPR). 
 
What doesn’t work, unsurprisingly, are efforts to impose Western or generic models. The 
work of Lant Pritchett, Michael Woolcock and Matt Andrews points clearly to how the basic 
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functions of government can fail to improve in a number of case studies around the world, 
coining the phrase ‘isomorphic mimicry’. A series of case studies show where state 
institutions have failed as they have followed Western models. While these examples relate 
largely to public sector reform they can apply equally to external actor support to 
empowerment and accountability initiatives. This is supported by evidence in relation to 
social and political action, for example in Sierra Leone there is criticism that programming on 
state-citizen relations is guided by generic templates (institutional channels such as setting 
up an ombudsman, human rights commissions and public consultation mechanisms) 
(International Alert 2015). In the Middle East and North Africa region an evaluation of the 
UK’s Arab Partnership (DFID and FCO) found that imposing blueprint models for anti-
corruption commissions and parliamentarian engagement with citizens failed to get sufficient 
traction and ownership at the national level unless they were specifically tailored to and 
emerged from a deep understanding of the context (IOD Parc – Triple Line 2015). 
 
Evidence of new approaches – external actors are ‘thinking and working politically’ 
Addressing existing power imbalances: One of the challenges identified in Section 4 of the 
main paper is the risk of elite capture of external actor efforts to support SPA. There is some 
evidence where this has occurred. In Ethiopia, one study indicated that donor support helped 
complete state capture and repression and contribute to the consolidation of an authoritarian 
regime. The government was not interested in accountability and donors were unwilling to 
impose real governance conditions. In not addressing the power dynamics between state 
and civil society in Ethiopia donors may have inadvertently entrenched elite capture of the 
state (Abegaz 2013). In Tanzania, although donor support has helped strengthen institutions 
that advance accountability, it simultaneously supports a status quo that undermines 
accountability and democratisation. Donor support had unintended consequences in 
undermining accountability through the provision of general budget support and through 
support of policies that undercut vertical accountability in decentralisation and in public 
goods provision (Tripp 2012). 
 
Significance of norms and perceptions of legitimacy: There is evidence that external actor 
support to changing social norms at the national level can work if done right. In Nigeria, the 
DFID-funded Voices for Change (V4C) project provides strong evidence where social norm 
changes are beginning to take place in specific groups and institutions. As a result of the 
project women are taking part increasingly in politics and elections, especially in colleges 
and universities; there is potential for ‘collective action for change’ through what are called 
the Purple Clubs, men’s networks and women’s platforms; the government is beginning to 
provide direct funding so that it benefits women; and progress has been made on changing 
the legal framework so that it upholds women’s rights (Itad 2016a). 
 
Thinking and working politically: It seems that what is critical to this thinking is an 
understanding of the political settlement in different contexts. In many FCVAS, there is a lack 
of accountability, a dominance of informal over formal relationships and institutions (e.g. 
traditional councils or local militia groups having more influence and power than local state 
authorities), and an absence of state-society relations for many people. External actors can, 
however, support SPA which leads to a more inclusive political settlement. Two macro-level 
case studies provide indications of what could work. The first study takes evidence mainly 
from three countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Ghana, South Africa and Uganda). A positive 
impact seems to occur where donors strengthen existing democratising trends, however 
attempts to create them seem destined to fail. In supporting civil society, external actors (in 
this case, donors) should review the range of CSOs targeted through democracy assistance 
programmes to ensure that groups in rural or urban low-income areas and those with a mass 
membership also receive adequate support. It would be better for donors to replace periodic 
grant support with long-term programme grants and technical assistance designed to build 
organisational capacity by strengthening fundraising mechanisms, financial management 
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systems and internal governance. They could provide specialised assistance aimed at 
strengthening capacity for policy analysis and advocacy, especially for organisations lacking 
these skills. Third, problems of financial dependence, reduced legitimacy and erosion of 
autonomy which arise from a heavy reliance on foreign aid could be mitigated by adopting 
strategies to identify and institutionalise local sources of funding from membership dues, 
indigenous philanthropy and internally generated sources of income. Fourth, aid donors 
should seek to promote a more supportive policy environment for CSOs by encouraging 
governments to remove restrictive controls and to simplify registration procedures (Robinson 
and Friedman 2005). 
 
A2.2 Mechanisms and strategies 
Organised civil society remains a strong starting point for external actors 
Evidence from recent case studies have demonstrated external actor support to civil society 
in FCVAS can have a significant impact on E&A outcomes. This evidence is drawn from 
recent evaluations of E&A programmes with civil society as the key stakeholders including 
the Accountability in Tanzania (AcT) programme (Itad 2015) and the multi-donor Democratic 
Governance Facility in Uganda (Triple Line 2016). For the latter programme, which was 
supported by eight donors, E&A interventions were part of a larger governance programme. 
Both evaluations considered the programme design to be relevant to the context and based 
on a political economy analysis. At the same time both evaluations found that results and 
impact were most notable at the local level and more challenging to scale up at the national 
level. For the AcT evaluation, the direct influence is most apparent in the area of civil society 
strengthening. Strong results are being achieved in the area of media reach and citizen 
action, but here AcT’s contribution is less strong. 
 
One case study demonstrates how external support to local community participation can 
contribute to the success of an accountability initiative – but also shows its limitations. In the 
case of a trail bridge project in Nepal the research focused on the relationship between the 
state and its citizens and on the accountability mechanisms operating on the supply-side and 
demand-side of that relationship (Cima 2013). The research demonstrated that villagers’ 
active engagement in public spaces (user committees) can represent an opportunity for 
‘empowerment’, mostly in the form of building a network of useful contacts within and outside 
the community. The research paper argues that the user committee space represents an 
accountability tool, while the public audit practice is a more symbolic space in which trust 
and legitimacy for the actors involved can be built. In a context of polarised power structures 
and discriminatory social and cultural traditions, however, the meaningful participation of 
traditionally disadvantaged groups is limited. 
 
A study summarising ten years of research from the Development Research Centre on 
Citizenship, Participation and Accountability (Benequista 2010) and based on over 150 case 
studies worldwide, argued that external actor (donor) programmes failed to recognise the 
opportunities presented by citizen engagement, and understanding the complex relationship 
between citizens and the state. It called on external actors to understand that citizens need 
greater political knowledge and awareness of their rights and of agency as an initial step in 
claiming these rights. It suggested that associations are an effective way in strengthening 
citizen engagement. 
 
Supporting unruly, spontaneous and cultural forms of action – social movements and 
associations 
As discussed in Section 4 of the main paper this is not an area which has readily and easily 
attracted external actors. It is seen by the donor community as having a high risk in being 
associated with actions which could be considered ‘too political’, ‘illegal’ or ‘undermining 
state legitimacy’. Other actors, however, particularly international NGOs, may be more 
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attracted to the potential advocacy and for the more spontaneous, grassroots nature of these 
actions. These conflicting stresses have been played out in discussions between donors and 
civil society on who to support for political and social action. The tensions are more 
pronounced in fragile, conflict and violence affected settings.  
 
The latent potential of SPA is well evidenced in terms of how organic movements have 
impacted on empowerment and accountability without external intervention. For example: 
 
 In India, the Workers and Farmers Power Organisation is widely credited for exposing 
fraud in several local governments, deterring further malfeasance in others, influencing 
legal debates and generating a wider campaign for legislative and regulatory change 
at the state and national level (Jenkins and Goetz 1999). 
 In Nepal, the Nepal Citizens’ Movement for Democracy and Peace (CMDP) emerged 
as an effective non-violent, apolitical movement (Earle 2011). 
 In Nigeria, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), produced a 
bill of rights setting out demands for political autonomy (Earle 2011). 
 In Tunisia and Morocco, advocacy by women’s rights groups led to their respective 
governments passing progressive Personal Status Laws (World Bank 2012). 
 International Alert in their 2015 report ‘Strike Action’ provide specific examples of 
street protests, demonstrations and blockades that have achieved varying degrees of 
success and failure. For example, protests against a ban on motorcycle taxis in the 
central business district (CBD) of Freetown, Sierra Leone in 2013 led to a reduction in 
the scope of the ban. The report suggests that protests are generally viewed by 
citizens as an effective tool for communicating, engaging with and influencing the 
policies and practices of both big business and government. 
 
There is however more limited evidence of the effectiveness of external actor support to 
social and political movements (Menocal and Sharma 2008). As noted above, external 
actors have historically avoided engagement with such endogenous movements; and where 
they have engaged E&A achievements have been mixed: 
 
 In Peru, international conservation organisations have worked with an indigenous 
movement, Consejo Machiguenga del Río Urubamba (COMARU), to oppose threats to 
their livelihoods by multinational corporations (McKie 2007). 
 In Sierra Leone, Western aid agencies have supported women’s movements to 
increase women’s political participation and influence (Castillejo 2009), which has in 
some cases led women’s organisations to develop projects in response to donor rather 
than community priorities. 
 Donor support to the pastoralist land rights movement in Tanzania (McKie 2007), 
which has resulted in the professionalisation of the social movement organisation, 
disillusionment of members, and the demobilisation of the movement. Tostan, an NGO 
in Senegal led a campaign against female genital cutting (FGC) from the 1990s, using 
kinship and social networks (Malhotra et al. 2009). 
 The Citizens’ Movement for Democracy and Peace has been instrumental in the 
development of civil society in Nepal, eventually contributing to a more empowered 
public and a more accountable government (Heaton-Shrestha and Adhikari 2013). 
Interestingly, the movement refused direct donor funding, but did receive indirect 
funding through NGOs for printouts, meeting rooms and travel. 
 As already identified, the Voices for Change programme in Nigeria is an example of a 
programme designed to catalyse social action and is based on the belief that it is 
necessary to ‘intervene from both the top down (mass media campaigns at the 
regional and national level) and the bottom up (on the ground work with key 
influencers)’. V4C uses a full range of communications, campaigning and media 
channels to stimulate a social movement of young people aged 15-35. There is 
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emerging evidence of success. The programme reports the potential actions for 
change through the Purple Clubs and the benefits of the purple brand and the support 
of ministries (DFID, Voices for Change, 2013: 18). 
 
Social movements may be of value to women since they do not require membership of a 
formal organisation. For example, in Tanzania, Uganda, Namibia, Morocco and Tunisia, 
women’s movements were instrumental in the passing of legislation or the amendment of 
discriminatory laws. An analysis of 70 countries from 1975-2005 found that women’s 
movements play a key role in pushing for policy change on Violence Against Women and 
Girls (VAWG) (Htun and Laurel Weldon 2012).  
 
External actors are now starting to think and act beyond the ‘usual civil society suspects’ and 
understand and support more organic types of SPA. In the aforementioned macro-study of 
100 different cases (Gaventa and Barrett 2010), there is sufficient evidence to see the value 
for external actors in supporting associations and social movements. Of the case studies 
cited they include a number of fragile and conflict-affected states including Bangladesh (ten 
case studies), Nigeria (four), Kenya (three), Angola (two) and Gambia (two). The study 
looked at the positive and negative outcomes of the citizen engagement projects across four 
dimensions of citizen engagement (see Table A2.1 below). 
 
Table A2.1: Outcomes of citizen engagement  
Area Positive Negative 
Construction of 
citizenship 
 Increased civic and political 
knowledge 
 Greater sense of 
empowerment and agency 
 Increased knowledge dependencies 
 Disempowerment and reduced sense 
of agency 
Practices of 
citizen 
participation 
 Increased capacities for 
collective action 
 New forms of participation 
 Deepening of networks and 
solidarities 
 New capacities used for ‘negative’ 
purposes 
 Tokenistic or ‘captured’ forms of 
participation 
 Lack of accountability and 
representation in networks 
Responsive and 
accountable 
states 
 Greater access to state 
services and resources 
 Greater realisation of rights 
 Enhanced state 
responsiveness and 
accountability 
 Denial of state services and resources 
 Social, economic and political reprisals 
 Violent or coercive state response 
Inclusive and 
cohesive 
societies 
 Inclusion of new actors and 
issues in public spaces 
 Greater social cohesion 
across groups 
 Reinforcement of social hierarchies 
and exclusion 
 Increased horizontal conflict and 
violence 
Source: Gaventa and Barrett 2010: 25 
 
Notable insights gained from the case studies related to fragile and conflict-affected settings 
include: 
 
 in relation to citizen engagement and the construction of citizenship - there is evidence 
of a continuous growth of knowledge and rights awareness from a study of members 
of a CSO, Nijera Kori (NK) in Bangladesh, which takes a rights-based approach in its 
work. In a comparative study of NK members and non-members affiliated with 
microfinance NGOs, the research authors (Kabeer with Kabir and Huq 2009) found 
that NK members were far more knowledgeable about their constitutional rights than 
non-members. The study also suggested that ‘women who participated in the NGO NK 
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were more likely to participate in decision-making within their households, less likely to 
vote according to their husband’s wishes and more likely to participate in other forms 
of political mobilisation than those women who were not engaged through the 
association (2009: 27)’. 
 in relation to citizen engagement and the practice of participation - some evidence 
points to a change in the dynamics of power which is considered to have emerged not 
only because of the greater awareness developed by citizens, but also greater skills to 
use that knowledge effectively. For instance, Mahmud (2010) writes about how worker 
engagement in the garment factories in Bangladesh has led to greater negotiating 
skills, arising from their realisation of the need to mobilise and organise, as well as 
their knowledge of international agreements, such as the International Labour 
Organisation conventions. 
 in relation to building networks and alliances - one study found that struggles for land 
reform in the Philippines caused a deepening of relationships and networks across 
state and society, illustrated when a network of peasant organisations and NGOs was 
able to initiate a dialogue with the government agency responsible for land reform, and 
to form a working committee to implement new reforms (Borras and Franco 2010). 
 In relation to citizen engagement and building responsive states, mobilisation by 
Naripokkho in Bangladesh on issues of health related to violence against women has 
led to new initiatives from the Government and UNICEF to provide support and 
treatment for survivors of acid attacks (Huq 2005). While in Angola, community 
associations involved in dealing with issues of displacement from the many years of 
civil war increasingly engaged in production-related activities to gain access to 
technical expertise, credit and agricultural inputs from government and other providers 
(Ferreira and Roque 2010). 
 
For external actors working in FCVAS, the research points to the need to recognise at an 
early stage in engagement the role which local associations and other citizen activities can 
play in strengthening cultures of citizenship which foster responsive states. Of particular 
interest was that more than two-thirds of the research studies in the weakest democratic 
settings were linked to associations. The authors suggest this finding has important 
implications for donors and activists who often assume that civil society presence in fragile 
settings is very weak or has little potential to be effective. There is evidence from a number 
of case studies indicating that external support to social movements and membership-based 
associations can be effective. But there are risks on both sides – for the external actors in 
becoming politicised and for the social movements in being co-opted. In one case in 
Tanzania donor funding with its conditionalities resulted in the professionalisation of a social 
movement organisation, disillusionment of members, and the demobilisation of the Barabaig 
movement and movements in other African countries (McKie 2007). 
 
When risks are managed, however, there is considerable potential for supporting social 
movements to lead to E&A outcomes. Earle and Pratt’s (2009) research found that social 
movements can act strategically to avoid or minimise such negative outcomes. In one case 
study from the Peruvian Amazon region the community organisation, COMARU, negotiated 
with different donors and acted strategically and cautiously in deciding whether to enter 
alliances with conservation organisations (see Box A2.1). In Sierra Leone, there is evidence 
that strike action (street protests, demonstrations and blockades) is generally viewed by 
citizens as an effective tool for communicating, engaging with and influencing the policies 
and practices of big business and government. Citizens have resorted to striking in the 
context of an inability to seek redress through official channels (petitions, meetings and 
consultations) (International Alert 2015). 
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Box A2.1: The COMARU study  
COMARU is an indigenous organisation which attempted to represent the needs of its member 
communities in the face of threats to livelihoods from multinational energy companies. The Earle 
and Pratt study asked particular questions about whether the aims of the COMARU movement had 
been co-opted by more powerful and better connected global actors. Findings from the study are 
suggestive in terms of risk management for external actors: 
 COMARU was cognisant of the risk of collaboration with INGOs, negotiated with different 
funding sources and acted cautiously before entering into alliances.  
 The study found that both the leadership and membership were acutely aware of the way in 
which external actors can try to privilege their own agendas and co-opt the leadership.  
 Members sanctioned any leader who was thought to be overly influenced by outsiders or who 
had put their own interests before that of the movement.  
 The leadership crafted a delicate balancing act between fundraising from external sources as a 
matter of organisational survival and trying to protect the autonomy of the organisation.  
 Movement leaders achieved this through a number of mechanisms, including the employment 
of different ‘frames’ establishing both distance from and association with the same agenda 
according to their audience.  
 They also used regular references to agreements in international law that supported the 
group’s claims to autonomy and specific rights.  
 However, these mechanisms were read by some external actors as radical and politicising and 
may have prevented the establishment of profitable relationships between the movement and 
external supporters.  
 Attempts by the movement to assert autonomy did not prevent co-option from a distance, as 
external actors asserted a close relationship with the organisation to lend support to their own 
particular international agenda. 
Source: Earle and Pratt (2009) 
 
However, questions remain as to whether social movements can lead to lasting change:  
 
Policy success is not always accompanied by the more fundamental and less obvious 
outcomes that underpin lasting change, such as popular awareness, increased 
capacity of organisations and stronger leadership. These outcomes are needed to 
maintain the gains that have been made and become essential resources in future 
campaigns.  
(Citizenship DRC 2011: 27) 
 
New social media – a game-changer or just a new tool for SPA? 
There is a growing body of evidence which points to new kinds of opportunities for external 
actors to support more spontaneous and organic forms of SPA. An innovative example of 
‘what could work’ comes from a recent case study on ‘The Role of Crowdsourcing for Better 
Governance in Fragile Contexts’ (Bott, Gigler and Young 2014). Evidence from initiatives in 
Haiti, Libya, Sudan and Guinea gives us a sense of what is possible in attracting and 
engaging citizens (at a national and global level) to participate in SPA and ultimately hold 
governments to account. The most relevant case studies for our synthesis report are 
crowdsourcing for transparency and civil rights in Guinea and Participatory Post-conflict and 
Recovery Mapping in Sudan: Building Peace and Stability. While potentially attractive there 
is a risk of over-selling the value of crowdsourcing on its own, but it could be an effective tool 
or method if combined with a more strategic approach. There is, however, a counter-risk in 
that it could undermine the voluntary, spontaneous, non-state led nature of crowdsourcing.  
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Providing indirect support - creating an enabling environment for civil society and 
other actors to engage 
Evidence is emerging that external actors can be instrumental in creating or supporting an 
enabling environment for SPA towards strengthening empowerment and accountability 
outcomes. In Sierra Leone for example the main recommendation for external actors is that 
they should facilitate the ‘enabling environment’ for social movements, rather than provide 
direct support. There are, however, risks in that external support could ‘projectise’ movement 
activities, create donor accountability rather than member accountability, and even co-opt 
the movement's agenda (Fernando 2012). Further evidence from a case study in Sierra 
Leone points to a focus on indirect approaches to improving state-citizen relations in fragile 
states. State-citizen relations in conflict-affected states are disproportionately shaped by 
indirect events (crisis, disruptive projects, etc.), and less by official channels and institutional 
reforms. International Alert recommended that external actors should ensure that 
programming on state-citizen relations is guided by a political-economy analysis to identify 
issues and sectors fundamental to citizens’ livelihoods (International Alert 2015). 
 
In a case study from Cambodia donor engagement appeared very successful in terms of 
creating political spaces in which grievances can be expressed by the poor themselves. 
While government concessions in response to such protests are rare, and violent repression 
has occasionally taken place, the fact that ordinary people keep coming back suggests that 
the poor themselves place a high value on the ability to voice complaints (ODI 2003). 
Attempts by donors to work at the grass roots level, however, have encountered a number of 
problems. First, there is the danger of overwhelming local capacities. In relation to both the 
local state and the NGO sector, the steep differential between international and local actors 
in confidence, power, and resources tends to result in actions which reflect international 
priorities. This undermines rather than enhances local confidence and perpetuates relations 
of dependency. 
 
In another case study from Mozambique (Faehndrich and Nhantumbo 2012) the external 
actors were international NGOs which supported national NGOs to play a supporting role at 
all levels of the political system, creating an enabling environment for accountability from the 
bottom to the top. Based on evidence, the study recommended the international NGOs 
should: embody accountability throughout the planning, implementation and monitoring 
process by sharing information, knowledge and opinions with stakeholders, beneficiaries and 
the general public; strengthen local organisations and their capacity to hold local authorities 
more accountable; sensitise local authorities, emphasising the incentives they have for being 
more accountable; provide an informational bridge between the district level on the one side 
and the provincial and national level on the other; and promote institutional change at the 
central level towards more political, administrative and financial decentralisation. 
 
A useful comparison can also be gleaned from a post-totalitarian state – Bulgaria (UNDP 
2012a). In what was then considered to be a changing and sometimes hostile politico-
institutional environment, UNDP’s main contribution to civic engagement was considered to 
have been to create a safe space for participation by playing the role of mediator between 
citizens and authorities. This resulted in: unleashing the potential of an existing and latent 
resource for community empowerment - the institution of the ‘chitalishte’; identifying local 
“agents of change” and investing in their capacities - mayors, chitalishte secretaries; using 
windows of opportunities as they opened – for example, the initiation of comprehensive 
governance reform, adoption of new legislation; demonstrating in practice the validity of a 
certain approach before scaling-up; and mobilising broader support and creating partnership 
platforms – following the so-called “never alone” policy. 
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Increasing interest in external support for multi-faceted approaches 
In a much-cited paper, Jonathan Fox (2014) looks at evidence from a number of case 
studies to see what works in social accountability initiatives. From studies in Uganda 
(education spending information campaign and community-based health clinic monitoring), 
Brazil (participatory municipal budgeting), India (right to information and social audits), 
Indonesia (community-driven development and village public works) he concludes: ‘More 
promising results emerge from studies of multi-pronged strategies that encourage enabling 
environments for collective action and bolster state capacity to actually respond to citizen 
voice’ (Fox 2014: 5). He also refers to a number of case studies which document cases 
where there has been a lack of clear impact – postulating that providing information on its 
own is not enough, bottom-up monitoring often lacks bite, and community-driven 
development programmes are often captured by elites. 
 
Evidence from a number of the case studies cited in the previous sections points to multi-
faceted approaches in bringing together a wide range of actors including both state and non-
state, for example in building social cohesion and strengthening accountability institutions, 
as well as avoiding stand-alone approaches and methods, such as providing access to 
information but not capacity building in how to make the best use of it. Case study evidence 
from Oxfam’s work in South Sudan, Yemen, Afghanistan and Palestine/Israel demonstrates 
how external support to a multi-faceted approach can work in practice. The emphasis in 
achieving success in some of the programmes has been on supporting constructive 
engagement between the state and its citizens, for example in organising public forums and 
dialogue, delivering training in good governance and enabling citizen feedback on proposed 
legislation in South Sudan. While Oxfam emphasises the importance of working with civil 
society in fragile states it argues ‘Working with civil society is an appropriate entry point – but 
it is not sufficient to promote good governance. Civil society should be supported to engage 
constructively with duty-bearers, and programme strategy may include linking civil society to 
other influential non-state actors and institutions’ (Oxfam 2013: 3).   
 
A2.3 Outcomes  
Achievements are more noticeable at the local rather than national level  
Evidence of results and outcomes is stronger at the community and local level rather than at 
the national level. 
 
In Cambodia case study evidence demonstrates that social accountability practices have led 
to improvements in the performance of government administration and public service 
delivery – but only at the local level and not demonstrably sustainable beyond the 
intervention period (Babovic and Vukovic 2014). As we have seen this is supported by 
experience from the case study on the Accountability in Tanzania programme: more results 
have been achieved at local level than at national level. Success factors were seen to be     
(i) working across demand and supply and, (ii) taking contextual factors into account (Itad 
2016a). 
 
Although not a FCVAS, a useful comparison can be gleaned from a case study of the civil 
society organisation MKSS (Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan) in India. Although nearly     
20 years old, the experience of MKSS is illustrative of the value and limitations of working 
with a broad set of actors. What MKSS seems to indicate is that anti-corruption campaigns 
require both broad-based participation in protest action and grassroots initiatives to involve 
ordinary people in auditing public expenditure at the local level. However – forms of civil 
society fostered by the state or development agencies are less effective. The Indian case 
demonstrates the potential for state-fostering to produce precisely the kinds of 
'compromised' CSOs which inhibit the emergence of effective anti-corruption movements 
based on local-level popular auditing (Jenkins and Goetz 1999). 
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